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The use of award-term 
contracts doesn’t seem 
to represent the best 
interests of the U.S. 
taxpayer—rather, it 
smacks terribly of the 
government acquisition 
environment of two 
decades ago that pre-
ceded the passage of 
the Competition in 
Contracting Act.
BY BRETT STEVENS 
AND E. CORY YODER
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The rising number of award-term 
incentive-type contracts should cause 
concern among government acquisi-
tion professionals. Over the last six 
years, use of award-term contracts 
has expanded considerably—thanks 
in part to the wave of acquisition  
reform during the past decade 
encouraging adaptation of commer-
cial best practices. But, do ultra-long 
business relationships forged by 
award-term contracts conform to all 
aspects of current acquisition policy 
or even represent the best interests  
of the U.S. taxpayer? 
Surprisingly, it appears they may 
not. Rather, the use of this no-cost 
incentive smacks terribly of the gov-
ernment acquisition environment 
of two decades ago that preceded 
passage of the Competition in 
Contracting Act, where competition 
had become the exception rather 
than the rule in acquiring goods and 
services. This essay explores the 
competitive implications and other 
repercussions of the award-term 
contract, as well as advantages and 
disadvantages of their use. This article 
provides insight into why the award-
term contract might not be in the 
best interest of the government from 
a business perspective.
The Basics
An award-term contract is comparable  
to the award-fee incentive-type 
contract found in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Part 16.405-2. 
Instead of rewarding a contractor for 
excellent performance with an addi-
tional fee, however, the award-term 
contract rewards the contractor by 
conveying the right to extend the 
term of the contract without having 
to compete for the award. 
 This small technicality distin-
guishes the award-term contract from 
other incentives. In essence, it says 
that if the contractor’s performance 
meets the award-term criteria out-
lined in the contract, and if all other 
stipulated conditions such as continu-
ing need and availability of funds are 
met, then the government must either 
extend the contract or terminate it for 
convenience or default. 
 To gauge how pervasive award-term 
contracts have become in the last 
six years, we conducted an informal 
survey based upon the methodology 
used by Vernon J. Edwards in early 
2002. Edwards, a researcher, writer, 
and teacher of federal contract-
ing, searched the synopses posted 
in the Commerce Business Daily 
and the announcements posted to 
FedBizOpps (the government point 
of entry for business opportunities 
greater than $25,000) for fiscal year 
2001 postings containing the phrase 
“award- term.”1 Research conducted 
for this article expanded this search 
to include fiscal years 1999 through 
2004, and the results are contained in 
Figure 1. The methodology included 
a search for the phrase “award-term” 
in all synopses (active and archived) 
across 103 government agencies. 
Shortcomings to this type of infor-
mal survey were similar to those 
Edwards experienced in 2002—since 
agencies are not required to men-
tion or describe incentive provisions 
in a synopsis of a proposed contract 
action, it is possible that the phrase 
“award-term” only appears in the 
context of the full solicitation and 
not the synopsis. Furthermore, mere 
mention of the phrase “award-term” 
in a synopsis does not necessarily 
mean the effort eventually went to 
contract using this method of no-cost 
incentive. 
 Notwithstanding these limitations, 
this informal survey reveals a marked 
increase in the mention of the phrase 
“award-term” in synopses issued dur-
ing fiscal years 1999 through 2004. 
Language contained in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
year 2005, granting permission for 
heads of agencies to extend contracts 
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beyond 10 years, may mean that use 
of award-term contracts will expand 
further still.2 
 Clearly, it appears that agencies 
(and the U.S. Congress) have begun 
to embrace this relatively new form 
of no-cost incentive. For insight into 
why this has occurred, let us look at 
the advantages and disadvantages of 
award-term contracting. 
Advantages 
Rewarding contractors with long-term 
relationships may provide a more 
powerful incentive than extra profit. 
Surely, extra profit is important to a 
business in reaching short-term goals. 
Profit earned over an extended peri-
od, however, is better aligned with the 
longer strategic goals of a firm, and 
therefore exerts greater influence on 
shaping contractor performance. 
 Those in industry tend to agree. 
There are numerous examples of 
firms that have incorporated long-
term business relationships into 
their business models. The authors 
of World Class Supply Management, 
describing what it takes to become a 
“world-class firm,” include long-term 
contracting and strategic sourcing as 
primary considerations in shaping 
supply-chain management strategy. 
Table 1 lists a few contemporary firms 
and their supplier base, and provides 
credence as to the importance leading 
firms place on establishment of fewer 
longer-term relationships.3
Other advantages afforded by the 
award-term incentive include an 
environment conducive to capital 
investment and process improvement. 
Long-term business relationships 
promote stability—both for the gov-
ernment and industry—and motivate 
investment in performance-enhancing 
technologies. Moreover, contractors 
view favorably the longer timeframe 
in which to amortize costs. Finally, 
providing the same service year after 
year enables contractors to gain cer-
tain production efficiencies that are 
not generally available to contractors 
subject to constant churn. These 
efficiencies, coupled with newer 
technologies, enable the contractor 
to reduce transaction costs over the 
span of the contract. 
For the government, new contract 
awards are expensive to plan, solicit, 
prepare, and evaluate. Besides, pro-
tests frequently delay contract award 
and can be a source of additional risk. 
Agencies can reduce their transaction 
costs (and their exposure to the risks 
associated with protests) by reducing 
the frequency with which they con-
duct new competitions for continuing 
service requirements. 
Disadvantages 
Equally important to consider are 
the disadvantages of the award-term 
contract. One long-term disadvan-
tage is the possibility that the agents 
of the contracting parties will begin 
to conduct business on a personal 
instead of a proper professional basis.4 
Ethics considerations aside, this 
type of relationship bodes trouble. 
Situations resulting in an overly famil-
iar relationship might lead to relaxed 
standards and an environment in 
which less than satisfactory results 
become acceptable. Unwittingly, the 
pressure of maintaining an amicable 
relationship might obfuscate good 
business judgment when formulating 
sound acquisition strategies. 
The potential neglect of fiscal law 
is a related topic. If the award-term 
contract is not structured properly, 
an overly zealous contracting officer 
might inadvertently create an entitle-
ment for the contractor in advance of 
funds. The potential for this occurring 
is related to the fact that award-term 
contracts actually convey the right of a 
contractor to continue work, provided 
certain performance criteria are met. 
The associate deputy assistant 
secretary of the air force (contract-
ing), faced with a rising incidence of 
award-term contract use, recognized 
this dilemma and issued a policy 
memorandum in March 2002 placing 
restrictions on their use.5 This was 
only temporary, however, since the 
same official lifted these restrictions 
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Firm Industry Number of Suppliers
Not “World-Class” “World-Class”
Xerox Electronics 5,000 400
Chrysler Automotive 2,500 300
Applied Materials Computer Electronics 1,200 400
Source: World Class Supply Management
Table 1.
Instead of rewarding a contractor for excellent performance with 
an additional fee, however, the award-term contract rewards 
the contractor by conveying the right to extend the term of the 
contract without having to compete for the award.
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one year later, after having reviewed 
the legality of such arrangements 
with the appropriate general coun-
sel. Nonetheless, the fact that such a 
memorandum was issued illustrates 
another aspect of award-term con-
tracts requiring careful vigilance. 
Perhaps the most disadvantageous 
aspect of the award-term incentive 
is the irreparable damage caused to 
the industrial base. With an already 
shrinking industrial base, character-
ized as a “very serious problem” 
by Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, erecting one more barrier 
to entry appears irrational.6 Do we 
really want to devise an acquisition 
strategy that caters only to a select 
few businesses? If the trend toward 
widespread use continues, firms not 
involved in long-term relationships 
will fall further and further behind, 
as those that are lucky enough to 
have won the long-term contract con-
tinue to improve their processes and 
enhance their products or services. 
Left unchecked, the government 
marketplace will appear less and less 
attractive to those firms considering 
doing business with the government 
until finally, these firms may be 
forced to leave this marketplace alto-
gether. If these conditions persist, the 
government actually loses because of 
reduced competition. 
 These were the very same condi-
tions that spawned passage of Public 
Law 98-369 Section 2701, which 
is commonly referred to as the 
Competition in Contracting Act of 
1984 (CICA). This law was specifical-
ly enacted to increase the number of 
government procurements conducted 
under the principles of full and open 
competition, as opposed to contracts 
that are issued under noncompetitive 
arrangements such as “sole-source” 
or “set-aside” awards. CICA requires 
(with limited exceptions) that con-
tracting officers promote and provide 
for full and open competition in 
soliciting offers and awarding U.S. 
government contracts over the simpli-
fied acquisition threshold. From the 
perspective of the taxpayer, maximum 
competition is desirable because if 
properly administered, competition 
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1.  Only one responsible source 
and no other supplies or 
services Awill satisfy agency 
requirements.
2.  Unusual or compelling  
urgency.
3.  Industrial mobilization; 
engineering, development, 
or research capability; or 
expert services.
4.  International agreement.
5.  Authorized or required  
by statute.
6.  National security.
7.  Public interest.
Seven Exceptions to Full 
and Open Competition
Source: Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 6.302
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results in timely delivery to the U.S. 
government of quality products and 
services at reasonable cost. 
Contracting, absent full and open 
competition, is a violation of statute 
unless permitted and fully justified by 
one of only seven exceptions, as listed 
in the sidebar on page 32. These 
seven exceptions are the only statu-
tory authorities available to restrict 
competition—thus, Congress has 
deliberately made it difficult to do so.7 
Not Useful for Government 
Acquisition Professionals
It is surprising, then, to discover 
that use of the award-term contract 
has shown such remarkable growth 
over the last six years. A credible 
idea, no doubt, as long-term business 
relationships represent the latest in 
commercial best practice. As we have 
seen, many leading firms have adopt-
ed similar strategies in their effort to 
trim costs and reduce variability in 
their supplier base. But does the idea 
translate into a useful tool for govern-
ment acquisition professionals? This 
article suggests not, for three reasons.
Reason 1: Weakens Defense 
Industrial Base
The defense industrial base can-
not afford to be weakened further. 
Increased use of award-term contracts 
will arguably erode the industrial base 
because the losing firms in any given 
competition must wait for longer 
periods of time until the job is re-com-
peted. In the meantime, if there is not 
sufficient government work to sustain 
the firm, it will be forced to look else-
where (i.e., outside the government 
marketplace) for work. Moreover, 
when attractive business opportuni-
ties are competed less often, the small 
and disadvantaged businesses are no 
longer able to sustain themselves for 
any prolonged period of time and are 
eventually forced out of business, due 
to the unavailability of work. 
Reason 2: Limits Competition
Award-term contracting stretches the 
limits of current statutory guidelines 
pertaining to the exceptions governing 
full and open competition. Award-
term contracts that last longer than 
five years effectively limit competition 
for the duration of the contract period 
of performance. Proponents of award-
term contracts lament that their use 
is not so radically different than using 
contract options. As long as the solici-
tation clearly states the award-term 
incentive and that the clauses added 
to the contract are modified to reflect 
the award-term incentive, then there 
should be no restrictions placed on 
their use. 
This argument, unfortunately, does 
not account for the fact that competi-
tion is essentially eliminated for five 
years (or more)—nor does it speak to 
the potential problem that arises from 
creating a contractual entitlement in 
advance of funds.
Reason 3: Increases Admin Time
Despite the research demonstrating 
that award-terms make better incen-
tives, one must realize that the cost 
savings associated with this particular 
commercial “best practice” is not 
the only concern of the government 
acquisition professional. 
True, efficiencies are gained as a 
result of consolidating the supplier 
base into a critical mass of vendors 
that is capable of providing long-term 
support and services. But, for the 
government acquisition professional, 
certain issues transcend the objective 
of saving money. Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Part 1.102 contains “addi-
tional” guiding principles for the 
government acquisition professional. 
For example, guiding principle num-
ber two is to minimize administrative 
operating costs, and guiding principle 
number four is to fulfill public policy 
objectives, such as the promotion of 
small or disadvantaged businesses.8 
Given these constraints, it appears 
unseemly that award-term contracts 
would make an appropriate part of 
any acquisition strategy, since they 
arguably require increased admin-
istrative oversight and do little to 
promote small or disadvantaged busi-
ness opportunity.
Conclusion & Recommendations
In the final analysis, award-term 
contracts indeed pose an interest-
ing dilemma for the acquisition 
professional. Understandably, this 
commercial “best practice” is an 
enticing, no-cost alternative to incen-
tivize contractors. From a narrow 
perspective, it does appear as if the 
advantages of such an arrangement 
are too good to pass up. Those in 
favor might argue the virtues of long-
term relationships and the realization 
of efficiencies gained by using a single 
contractor for a longer period of time. 
Undoubtedly, their argument would 
include a cost-benefit analysis pro-
nouncing the scales tipped in favor of 
the benefits. 
Those with a broader perspective, 
however, would argue differently. 
A more accurate accounting would 
reveal a disproportionately higher level 
of costs. For example, there is the cost 
of additional barriers to entry created 
by use of award-term contracts. Or, 
the cost to enforce countermanding 
government policy—most notably, the 
stark contrast between CICA, which 
promotes full and open competition, 
and award-term contracting, which 
arguably lessens the degree to which 
contracts can be competed. Finally, 
there is the cost of foregone opportu-
nity, once federal government public 
policy objectives are sidelined. Not 
wanting to play in the federal govern-
ment acquisition arena is one thing; 
not being able to because of policy 
that fails to help the little guy is quite 
another.
Therefore, in consideration of 
these largely unnoticed yet signifi-
cant costs, we support limited use of 
award-term contracts. The decision 
as to the appropriateness of such an 
arrangement should only be made fol-
lowing close scrutiny of the business 
case. To be precise, the award-term 
contract ought to demonstrate mea-
surably substantial benefits in spite of 
its many costs, as discussed earlier. 
Applying pre-determined savings 
thresholds, similar to those used 
when making decisions regarding the 
bundling of contracts, represents a 
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logical extension of a methodology 
currently in place for decisions affect-
ing competition. We support adopting 
such an approach but with the added 
constraint of time in which benefits 
are to be achieved.
At the very least, agency and pro-
curing competition advocates must 
be increasingly vigilant toward the 
increased use of award-term con-
tracts, and must be prepared to alert 
contracting officials if their use ever 
jeopardizes the government’s best 
business interests. CM
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